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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.  
 This dispute concerns an interstate compact between 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey that created the Delaware River 
Joint Toll Bridge Commission. The Commission obtained 
from the District Court a declaratory judgment that prohibited 
the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and 
Industry from regulating aspects of the Commission’s new 
Scudder Falls Administration Building in Bucks County, 
Pennsylvania. The Secretary appeals, claiming the District 
Court erred by holding that Pennsylvania ceded its sovereign 
authority to enforce its building safety regulations when it 
entered into the Compact. We will affirm.  
I 
 In 1934, the Pennsylvania and New Jersey legislatures 
enacted laws creating the Commission, which Congress 
approved in 1935 under the Compact Clause of the United 
States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 19, cl. 3. The 
Commission was tasked with, among other things, “the 
acquisition of toll bridges over the Delaware River,” and “[t]he 
administration, operation, and maintenance” of such bridges. 
Act of Aug. 30, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-411, § 9, 49 Stat. 1051, 
1059.1 
 
1 The Compact has been amended several times since its 
creation in 1935; none of these amendments have altered the 
relevant language here. See e.g., Federal Aid Highway Act of 
1987, § 151, Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 132, 206. The 
Compact is also codified in Pennsylvania’s and New Jersey’s 





 To assist the Commission in the discharge of its duties, 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey granted it the power “[t]o 
acquire, own, use, lease, operate, and dispose of real property 
and interest in real property, and to make improvements 
thereon,” as well as “[t]o determine the exact location . . . and 
all other matters in connection with, any and all improvements 
or facilities which it may be authorized to own, construct, 
establish, effectuate, maintain, operate or control.” Id. at 1060. 
The Commission also was granted sweeping authority 
[t]o exercise all other powers . . . reasonably 
necessary or incidental to the effectuation of its 
authorized purposes or to the exercise of any of 
the powers granted to the commission . . . except 
the power to levy taxes or assessments for 
benefits; and generally to exercise, in connection 
with its property and affairs and in connection 
with property under its control, any and all 
powers which might be exercised by a natural 
person or a private corporation in connection 
with similar property and affairs. 
Id. Since its creation, the Commission has “owned, 
constructed, operated, and maintained bridges between the two 
states under the Compact.” Del. River Joint Toll Bridge 
Comm’n v. Oleksiak, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2020 WL 1470856, at 
*2 (E.D. Pa. 2020). 
 The controversy giving rise to this appeal began in 
2017, when the Commission undertook a project to replace the 
Scudder Falls Bridge that connects Bucks County, 
Pennsylvania with Mercer County, New Jersey. As part of that 
project, the Commission purchased ten acres of land near the 




on the Scudder Falls Administration Building, which would 
house the Commission’s executive and administrative staff in 
a single location. A year later, inspectors with the Pennsylvania 
Department of Labor and Industry observed construction at the 
site, even though the Commission never applied for a building 
permit as required under the Department’s regulations. The 
Department stated it would issue a stop-work order for want of 
a permit. The Commission responded that it was exempt from 
Pennsylvania’s regulatory authority under the express terms of 
the Compact. 
 The Commission pushed forward and completed the 
Scudder Falls Administration Building. The Department 
eventually turned its attention to the Commission’s elevator 
subcontractor, threatening it with regulatory sanctions for its 
involvement in the project. 
Within weeks of the threat against its elevator 
subcontractor, the Commission filed a complaint against the 
Secretary in the District Court seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief. The Commission sought a declaration that the 
Department lacked the authority to enforce Pennsylvania’s 
building regulations (as well as its flammable and combustible 
liquid regulations) “absent express language in the Compact 
itself.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 1. It also sought a preliminary 
injunction to prevent the Secretary from enforcing the 
Department’s regulations.  
The District Court granted the Commission’s 
preliminary injunction motion, enjoining the Secretary from 
directing the Department to “seek[] to inspect or approve the 
elevators in the . . . Scudder Falls Administrative Building or 




contractors or subcontractors from immediately repairing and 
activating the elevator systems.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 16, at 2. 
After the District Court granted the preliminary 
injunction, the Secretary filed an answer and counterclaim for 
declaratory relief. The Secretary denied the Commission’s 
claims that Pennsylvania lacked the power to enforce its 
building and safety regulations against the Commission. In the 
Secretary’s view, Pennsylvania “reserved its regulatory power 
over certain property use matters as an exercise of its 
fundamental police powers to protect the health, safety and 
welfare of its citizens.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 17, at 24. Among the 
claimed reserved regulatory powers was the ability to enforce 
“critical safety-based laws applying to building construction, 
elevator construction, boiler installation and operation, and 
combustible and flammable liquid storage and dispensing.” Id. 
In February 2020, the parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment. As relevant here, the District Court 
granted the Commission’s motion for declaratory relief, 
reasoning that “under the express terms of the . . . Compact 
creating the [Commission],” the Secretary “may 
not . . . unilaterally interfere, direct, inspect, or regulate” the 
Commission’s “elevator operations” under the Pennsylvania 
Uniform Construction Code or the Commission’s “tanks, 
pumps, and other fuel-dispensing devices” under the 
Department’s Combustible and Flammable Liquids Act 
regulations, at the Scudder Falls Administration Building. Dist. 
Ct. Dkt. No. 67, at 2. The Secretary timely appealed.  
II 
 The interpretation of a bi-state compact approved by 




Eng’rs, Local 542 v. Del. River Joint Toll Bridge Comm’n, 311 
F.3d 273, 275 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The District 
Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and our 
jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id.  
III 
 The Secretary first claims the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction because the Commission’s complaint was barred 
by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The Eleventh Amendment states: “The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law 
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects 
of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Although the 
text of the Eleventh Amendment only explicitly mentions 
“Citizens of another State, or . . . Citizens . . . of any Foreign 
State,” the Supreme Court has consistently held the scope of 
state immunity extends beyond the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14–15 
(1890) (holding the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a 
state commenced by its own citizens); Principality of Monaco 
v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934) (same as to foreign 
nations); Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak & Circle Vill., 
501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (“[W]e have understood the Eleventh 
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the 
presupposition of our constitutional structure which it 
confirms.”). As a general rule, “‘federal courts may not 
entertain a private person’s suit against a State’ unless the State 
has waived its immunity or Congress has permissibly 




of N.J., 961 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Va. Off. for 
Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart (VOPA), 563 U.S. 247, 254 (2011)).2 
 Under a federal court’s equitable powers, however, 
there is an important exception to this general rule: in certain 
circumstances, a plaintiff may bring a federal suit against state 
officials. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In such 
cases, state officials are stripped of their official or 
representative character and thereby deprived of the State’s 
immunity when they commit an ongoing violation of federal 
law. Waterfront Comm’n, 961 F.3d at 238. 
 The legal fiction recognized in Ex parte Young is 
narrow in scope. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 114 n.25 (1984). It requires us to 
“conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint 
alleges an ongoing violation of federal law” and whether it 
“seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon 
Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 
(2002) (cleaned up). 
The terms of the Compact adopted by Congress are 
federal law. See Operating Eng’rs, 311 F.3d at 275. By 
alleging the Secretary’s actions would violate the Compact the 
Commission has alleged an ongoing violation of federal law.  
 
2 A state-created entity, such as the Commission, with the 
power “[t]o sue and be sued,” Pub. L. No. 74-411, § 9, 49 Stat. 
at 1060, may bring an action against a state subject to the same 
Eleventh Amendment limitations as a private citizen. See 
VOPA, 563 U.S. at 256 (“[T]he validity of an Ex parte Young 




The relief sought by the Commission—a declaration as 
to Pennsylvania’s power to regulate the Scudder Falls 
Administration Building—is prospective. Just as the injunction 
upheld in Ex parte Young enjoined the Attorney General of 
Minnesota to conform his conduct with federal law (the 
Fourteenth Amendment), the relief sought here likewise 
requires the Secretary to conform his conduct to federal law 
(the Compact). See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 145. In sum, 
the Commission’s suit seeks prospective relief to prevent an 
ongoing violation of federal law by the Secretary. It falls 
squarely within the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign 
immunity. 
The Secretary argues Ex parte Young does not apply 
because the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, not the 
Secretary, is the real party in interest. We disagree. The relief 
sought—a declaration that the Secretary cannot lawfully 
enforce Pennsylvania’s building regulations against the 
Commission—neither “expend[s] itself on the public treasury 
or . . . interfere[s] with public administration,” nor operates as 
“an order for specific performance of a State’s contract.” 
Waterfront Comm’n, 961 F.3d at 239 (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted). 
 First, the relief sought does not resemble a money 
judgment that interferes with public administration. While the 
declaratory judgment may have an impact on Pennsylvania’s 
revenues (such as the loss of inspection fees), “[s]uch an 
ancillary effect on the state treasury is a permissible and often 
an inevitable consequence of the principle announced in Ex 
parte Young.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974). 
 Second, the relief sought is not specific performance of 




relies heavily on our recent decision in Waterfront 
Commission. There, we overturned the District Court’s order 
requiring New Jersey “to continue to abide by the terms of [a 
bi-state] agreement” after the State had taken the affirmative 
step of repealing its earlier legislation that had contributed to 
the formation of the compact. Waterfront Comm’n, 961 F.3d at 
237, 241–42. Forcing New Jersey to abide by a compact it had 
expressly rejected through proper legislative channels, we 
held, was “tantamount to specific performance [that] would 
operate against the State itself.” Id. at 241. Quite unlike that 
situation, here Pennsylvania did not seek to disavow the 
Compact. A declaratory judgment requiring the Secretary to 
respect the Compact as written does not constitute an 
impermissible order of specific performance—to hold 
otherwise would allow state officials to evade federal law by 
merely invoking the Eleventh Amendment. 
 Because the relief sought would neither drain public 
funds nor amount to “an order for specific performance of a 
State’s contract,” Waterfront Comm’n, 961 F.3d at 239, 
Pennsylvania is not the real party in interest; the Secretary is. 
 Having confirmed our jurisdiction, next we consider the 
scope of the powers Pennsylvania ceded under the Compact.  
IV 
 The District Court found Pennsylvania unambiguously 
ceded some of its sovereign authority through the Compact. 
“[W]e review de novo the text of the Compact to determine 
whether we agree with the District Court that it is 
unambiguous.” Wayne Land & Min. Grp. LLC v. Del. River 
Basin Comm’n, 894 F.3d 509, 528 (3d Cir. 2018). “[I]f we 




whether [the Secretary’s] proposed activities . . . fall within the 
scope of the Compact’s text.” Id. 
Our decisions in Operating Engineers and HIP 
Heightened Independence & Progress, Inc. v. Port Authority 
(HIP), 693 F.3d 345, 358 (3d Cir. 2012), two similar Compact 
Clause cases, guide our approach to the Compact here. In 
Operating Engineers, we were asked to determine whether 
New Jersey or Pennsylvania collective bargaining laws could 
be applied against the Commission. 311 F.3d at 274. We 
refused “[t]o read into the Compact any collective bargaining 
requirements” because the Compact’s silence as to the 
authority of the States to enforce such laws did not amount to 
a grant of permission. Id. at 281. Mindful of the important 
“[p]rinciples of federalism” at issue, we held that, absent 
express language to the contrary, “[a] bi-state entity created by 
compact, is ‘not subject to the unilateral control of any one of 
the States that compose the federal system.’” Id. (quoting Hess 
v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 42 (1994)). To 
interpret the Compact otherwise “would be to rewrite the 
agreement between the two states without any express 
authorization to do so.” Id. Now, as then, “[t]hat is simply not 
our role.” Id. 
 Similarly, in HIP we considered a bi-state compact that 
created the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and 
addressed the power of New Jersey to apply its civil rights and 
construction laws to property of the Port Authority. HIP, 
693 F.3d at 349. We declined to enforce New Jersey’s statutes 
against the Port Authority even though the Compact lacked an 
“express surrender of state sovereignty regarding external 
relations.” Id. at 358. Such an argument, we held, 
“misapprehends the notion of sovereignty surrender” discussed 




Engineers. Id. Although “court[s] must be hesitant to find a 
surrender of sovereignty where it is ambiguous,” the creation 
of a bi-state entity pursuant to the Compact Clause is an 
unambiguous surrender. Id. “By expressly creating the bi-state 
entity, [the compacting States] relinquished all control over the 
[entity] unless otherwise stated in the compact.” Id. Here, as in 
HIP, the surrender of sovereignty was expansive and clear; 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey “relinquished all control over 
the [Commission].” See id. (emphasis added). 
 The specific language of the Compact also indicates that 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey delegated the relevant regulatory 
authority. “Interstate compacts are construed as contracts 
under the principles of contract law.” Tarrant Reg’l Water 
Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614, 628 (2013). So we look to 
“the express terms of the Compact as the best indication of the 
intent of the parties.” Wayne Land, 894 F.3d at 527 (quoting 
Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 628).  
 As the District Court held, the Compact’s text 
unambiguously cedes Pennsylvania’s sovereign authority over 
building safety regulations. It grants the Commission the 
power “[t]o acquire, own, use, lease, operate, and dispose of 
real property and interest in real property, and to make 
improvements thereon,” as well as power over “all other 
matters in connection with[] any and all improvements or 
facilities which it may be authorized to own, construct, 
establish, effectuate, maintain, operate or control.” Pub. L. No. 
74-411, § 9, 49 Stat. at 1060. In defining real property, the 
Compact includes “structures,” id. at 1062, i.e., “[t]hat which 
is built or constructed; an edifice or building of any kind,” see 
Structure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933). Thus, the 
Compact grants the Commission the authority to acquire 




improvements upon the property (construction of the 
Administration Building), and the power over “all other 
matters in connection with . . . [its] facilities” (the operation 
and maintenance of elevators).   
 Pennsylvania (and New Jersey) also ceded sovereign 
authority to the Commission when they authorized it, in the 
broadest terms, “[t]o exercise all other powers . . . which may 
be reasonably necessary or incidental to the effectuation of its 
authorized purposes . . . except the power to levy taxes.” Pub. 
L. No. 74-411, § 9, 49 Stat. at 1060 (emphasis added). As the 
District Court noted, “[t]he ordinary meaning of ‘all other 
powers’ does not provide a limitation retaining the 
Commonwealth’s police power.” Del. River, 2020 WL 
1470856, at *13. Finally, the fact that Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey expressly reserved their taxing power—but not other 
powers—supports the District Court’s conclusion that they did 
not intend to retain the authority to enforce building safety 
regulations. 
* * * 
 For the reasons stated, we hold Pennsylvania ceded its 
sovereign authority to enforce its building safety regulations as 
to the Scudder Falls Administration Building. We will 
therefore affirm the District Court’s declaratory judgment 
against the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor 
and Industry. 
